Piercing the Corporate Veil of a New York Not-For-Profit Corporation by Caudill, Matthew D.
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 8, Number 2 2003 Article 4
Piercing the Corporate Veil of a New York
Not-For-Profit Corporation
Matthew D. Caudill∗
∗
Copyright c©2003 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL OF A NEW
YORK NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION
Matthew D. Caudill*
"For every human problem, there is a neat, simple solution; and
it is always wrong. '
INTRO D U CTION .................................................................................. 450
I. CAUSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE UNDER
NEW YORK NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW ............................................ 456
A. Action for Removal or Suspension of Officer
or D irector ................................................................................ 456
B. Misconduct Action Against Officer or Director ................... 456
C . Crim inal Penalties ................................................................... 460
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL ............................................... 462
A . R ationale .................................................................................. 463
B . T ests .......................................................................................... 464
1. A lter E go ............................................................................ 464
2. Instrum entality .................................................................. 465
3. E quity ................................................................................. 466
4. Public Policy ....................................................................... 466
C. Inter-Affiliate Liability ............................................................ 467
1. R everse Piercing ................................................................ 467
2. Triangular Piercing ............................................................ 469
3. Diagram: Piercing the Corporate Veil-Reverse
and Triangular Piercing ................................................... 470
4. Critical O bservations ........................................................ 470
Associate, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, New York. J.D., magna cum
laude, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2002. The views expressed herein
are strictly those of the author. The author thanks Marie Buckley and Nina
Crimm for their contributions to the development of this Article.
1. Henry L. Mencken, Mencken's Metalaw, at
http://www.olympicpc.com/quotes/menckensmetalaw.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
450 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
D. Piercing Approach in New York ........................................... 472
III. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 477
A. Types of Not-for-Profit Corporations Organized
Under N ew York Law ............................................................ 479
B. Not-for-Profit Corporate Board ............................................ 481
IV. PIERCING APPLIED TO NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTITIES ............... 482
A. Jurisdictions Recognizing Piercing in
N ot-for-Profit Context ............................................................ 483
B. Need for Piercing in Context of New York
Not-for-Profit Corporations ................................................... 485
C. Piercing Applied to New York Not-for-Profit
C orp orations ............................................................................ 488
C O N CLU SIO N ...................................................................................... 489
INTRODUCTION
The S.H. and Helen R. Scheuer Family Foundation (the
"Foundation"), a New York not-for-profit corporation, organized
largely from revenues under the estate of Helen R. Scheuer,
engaged in philanthropic activities, generally donating funds to
other charitable organizations.2 In 1989 alone, the Foundation
made charitable donations of $9,000,00. In that year, Steven H.
Scheuer ("Scheuer") on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of the
Foundation, sued eight directors (the "Directors"), 61 Associates,
and 61 Associates Corp. (collectively, "61 Associates") for
imprudent and negligent investment activity resulting in lost
revenues to the Foundation.4
Scheuer served on the board of directors and was a member of
the Foundation.' 61 Associates served as the investment advisor to
the Foundation and the Directors purportedly controlled 61
Associates.6
2. S.H. & Helen R. Scheuer Family Found, Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d
662, 663-64 (App. Div. 1992).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 663. Scheuer served as one of the twelve directors and members of
the Foundation from 1984 until 1989. Id. A short time after filing the lawsuit,
Scheuer was removed Scheuer as a director. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 668.
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Scheuer's amended complaint alleged six causes of action
against the Directors for engaging in various activities which
resulted in the loss of substantial assets to the Foundation!
Scheuer sought recovery of the Foundation's lost assets (totaling
$5,650,442)8 and removal of the Directors from the Foundation
He also sought to permanently bar the Directors from exercising
any power on behalf of the Foundation. ° Finally, Scheuer
petitioned the court for recovery of those assets which 61
Associates allegedly lost as a result of negligent investment
decisions."
7. Id. at 664-65. The first cause of action alleged that the Directors
"breached their duty of loyalty to the Foundation by engaging in an illegal cover-
up scheme designed to forestall investigation of an improper relationship
between the Foundation and 61 Associates." Id. at 665. The second cause of
action alleged that the Directors mismanaged the investments of the Foundation.
Id. The third cause of action alleged that the Directors "negligently selected,
supervised, and monitored 61 Associates as its delegee with the authority to
invest, reinvest, and manage the funds of the Foundation." Id. at 666. The fourth
cause of action alleged that the Directors improperly charged the Foundation
$581,200 for office space. Id. at 664. The fifth cause of action alleged that the
Directors caused the Foundation to loan a partnership certain funds, when two of
the Directors were general partners of said partnership. Id. The sixth cause of
action alleged that 61 Associates made negligent decisions in investing the funds
of the Foundation. Id. at 666. Scheuer amended his complaint to consolidate the
seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action into the first cause of action. Id. at 665.
8. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 9-10, 21, 23, 61 Assocs., 582
N.Y.S.2d at 662 [hereinafter Amended Complaint] (stating allegations of
wrongdoing, rather than proven facts, since the dispute never proceeded to trial).
The Amended Complaint estimated the following losses:
(i) $802,317 in loans to 61 Associates on November 30, 1988; (ii) $581,200
improperly charged to the Foundation for office space from 1985-88; (iii)
aggregated losses of $1,371,425 from the improper investment of Foundation
funds in "undercapitalized, illiquid, thinly-traded securities of speculative
quality, manifestly improper for investments by a foundation;" (iv) $1,018,500
in improper commissions charged to the Foundation for an absurd number of
trades in the portfolio of the Foundation in the 1987-88 period alone; and (v)
$1,877,000 for the loss of 30% of the value of the Foundation's shares of
Southdown stock when the Directors refused to sell the shares at the
recommendation of independent analysts.
Amended Complaint at 9-10, 21, 23.
9. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 662-63.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 666 (noting that Scheuer's third cause of action attempts to
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Scheuer alleged that the Directors engaged in unethical
business practices that resulted in substantial losses to the
Foundation in an attempt to realize personal financial gain.12 The
Directors purportedly blocked Scheuer's attempts to investigate
the services provided by 61 Associates. 3 Specifically, Scheuer
alleged that the Directors attempted to bribe Scheuer, revoke
Scheuer's donation designation power, 4 blackmail Scheuer,' and
improperly "released each other from claims held by the
Foundation against each of them as individuals."' 6 In addition, the
Directors also allegedly concealed independent consultant reports
concerning those investments from which the Directors personally
establish the Directors' liability for their alleged negligent investing).
12. Id. at 665.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Directors revoked Scheuer's power to designate donees of the
Foundation in $75,000 increments. Id. The Directors then offered to reinstate the
power and raise the amount to $400,000 if Scheuer agreed to vote to release
claims by the Foundation against the Directors. Id.
15. Id. The Directors threatened to publicize "damaging allegations
concerning [Scheuer] and his brother" and claimed that it was because of those
allegations that the Directors withheld certain financial information. Id. On
January 18, 1989, the Directors allegedly threatened that, if Scheuer, and his
brother James, did not immediately cease investigations, the Directors would
conspire to ruin James's congressional career by publicizing statements:
(i) that he had improperly made Foundation donations to groups and
individuals in his congressional district in order to "buy" their support and
votes;
(ii) that James had improperly participated in the management of valuable
California real estate held for his benefit in a blind trust; and
(iii) that James had engaged in illegal conduct with the late Donald Manes,
former Queens Borough President.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint at 14, 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 662 [hereinafter
Opposition Brief].
Representative James Scheuer (D-NY) represented District 8 in Manhattan and
Brooklyn in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1965-1973 and 1975-1993.
See http://profiles.numbersusa.com/improfile.php3?DistSend=NY&VIPID=581
(last visited Feb. 28, 2003). The Directors allegedly threatened Scheuer with
destroying his career by publicizing statements that he had improperly paid
certain Foundation donations to an employee. See Opposition Brief at 14.
16. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 665. One element of the alleged
indemnification compelled binding confidential arbitration of future claims. See
Opposition Brief at 15-16.
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benefited."
One particularly troubling accusation involved the refusal to
sell the Foundation's shares of Southdown, Inc. ("Southdown"), a
publicly traded company, despite the reports of Goldman Sachs &
Co. ("Goldman") stating that the shares were unlikely to increase
in value." Scheuer alleged that both the Directors and 61
Associates were improperly affiliated with Southdown,"9 concealed
the recommendations of Goldman,' and caused the Foundation to
sell the shares at a later date at a "substantially reduced amount."2'
Presumptively, the Foundation "held the bag" while other equity
holders sold their shares for around $50/share, causing the
Southdown shares to decrease in value. Sometime afterwards, the
Foundation sold its shares, and lost nearly $2 million in the interim.
The Directors also allegedly blocked efforts to investigate the
trading activity of 61 Associates during this period.
The New York Supreme Court dismissed the claims against
the Directors as protected transactions, governed by the business
judgment rule, which precludes a court from inquiring into
corporate decision-making, so long as the decisions made were
honest and disinterested. On appeal, Scheuer argued that the
alleged transactions involved self-dealing and were thereby
exceptions to the business judgment rule.24 The Appellate Division
17. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 665-66.
18. Id. at 665.
19. Id. ("[R]epresentatives of 61 Associates served as principal officers [of
Southdown] and a large percentage of which was owned by separate Scheuer
family interests also represented by 61 Associates... .
20. Id.
21. Id. According to the Amended Complaint, by June 5, 1980, the
Foundation owned 28% of the outstanding shares of Southdown. See Amended
Complaint at 22-23. For six years thereafter, the Foundation was the controlling
shareholder of Southdown. Id. In February 1987, Goldman advised the Directors
to sell the shares of Southdown for $50/share. Id. Instead, the Directors
concealed the Goldman report, waited and sold the shares at a later date for
$34.89/share. Id.
22. Id. at 665. Interestingly, the accounting reports submitted to the board
over a three-year period were the product of an accounting company controlled
by one of the Directors. Id.
23. Id. at 664; see also infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
24. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
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agreed with Scheuer and reinstated the claims against the Directors
and 61 Associates.
While the remaining events in this dispute are not a matter of
public record 6 even if Scheuer prevails on each of the causes of
action and recovers the maximum damage award, that award
would not adequately compensate for the purported wrongdoing.
The alleged causes of action27 would entitle the Foundation to an
accounting by the Directors only for the assets of the Foundation
that the Directors mismanaged and that 61 Associates negligently
invested. 8 Furthermore, under the removal remedy,29 the Directors
could be permanently barred from exercising power on behalf of
the Foundation." While these determinations could restore the
Foundation to its prior standing in a strict financial sense3 and
protect the Foundation from future wrongdoing by the Directors,
these remedies fail: (i) to hold the Directors and 61 Associates
responsible for the abuse of the Foundation entity; 2 (ii) to
compensate the beneficiaries of the Foundation for lost services
and donations;3 and (iii) to deter future wrongdoing. 4
25. Id.
26. There are no further entries listed in the on-line databases of Westlaw or
Lexis.
27. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 664-66 (describing the six causes of action
alleged).
28. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 720 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (McKinney
2001); see also Amended Complaint at 9-10, 21, 23 and supra note 8 (detailing
the alleged losses totaling $5,650,442).
29. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (describing removal action
of an officer or director of a non-profit corporation as authorized by New York
law).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 706(d).
31. The Foundation could reclaim the position it had prior to the financial
mismanagement, but still lose years of potentially successful operations and,
ultimately, potential revenue.
32. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 720 (a)(1)(A)-(B); see also
Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 568 (1981) (arguing that the current mechanism for enforcing the fiduciary
obligations of nonprofit directors and officers is insufficient); infra notes 115-22
and accompanying text.
33. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
As an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313,
1316 (2000) (stating that no punishment justification theories are concerned with
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
The equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil empowers
an aggrieved plaintiff to disregard the separateness provided by a
limited liability entity and hold responsible individual members of
that entity for its acts or obligations. 5 Under New York law,6
piercing is a common law remedy available to plaintiffs pursuing a
business corporation ("BC"), 37 but not for plaintiffs pursuing a not-
for-profit corporation 8 under similar circumstances. This Article
will analyze the purposes behind this distinction, including the
development of piercing, the policies underlying BCs and not-for-
profit corporations, and the possible application of piercing to a
not-for-profit corporation.
Part I will review the causes of action currently available under
New York not-for-profit law. Part II will provide an overview of
piercing, including the underlying rationale, theories, corollary
doctrines, and the piercing approach in New York. Part III will
examine the not-for-profit corporation and the distinctions
between it and the BC. Part IV will outline other jurisdictions that
allow piercing to apply to a not-for-profit entity, consider the
appropriateness of such a remedy under New York Law, and
conclude that allowing the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil of a
not-for-profit corporation would complement the current statutory
framework. The Conclusion will then return to the Foundation,
discuss the proposed piercing elements under New York law and
demonstrate the need and usefulness of this remedy in the context
of not-for-profit corporations.
reimbursement); see also Hansmann, supra note 32, at 505.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 241-45.
35. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 109(b)(5), 720 (McKinney 2001).
36. A not-for-profit entity is subject to the laws of the state of New York if it
is a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation that is authorized or conducts
activities in New York. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 103.
37. A BC is subject to the New York Business Corporation Law. See N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 101-1603.
38. For purposes of this Article, the considerations involving not-for-profit
(or non-profit) entities shall be limited to those entities organized as
corporations. Therefore, those entities organized as trusts shall be outside the
scope of this Article.
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I. CAUSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE UNDER NEW YORK NOT-FOR-
PROFIT LAW
New York enacted the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law ("N-
PCL") in 1970, the first of its kind in the United States.39 The N-
PCL sets forth the duties, liabilities, and remedies applicable to the
not-for-profit corporation board of directors, officers, and
members.'
A. Action for Removal or Suspension of Officer or Director
The Attorney General ("AG"), or ten percent of the members
of a not-for-profit corporation may bring an action to remove a
director. ' In a similar matter, the N-PCL provides:
An action to procure a judgment removing an officer for cause
may be brought by the [AG], by any director, by ten percent of
the members, whether or not entitled to vote, or by the holders
of ten percent of the face value of the outstanding capital
certificates, subvention certificates or bonds having voting
42
rights.
In the removal action of either a director or officer, the court has
discretion to fix the time of the removal period.43
B. Misconduct Action Against Officer or Director
The AG, an officer or director of the not-for-profit
corporation, the not-for-profit corporation itself, a member thereof
39. See generally N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 101-1411; WILLIAM
E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 12-1(c) (6th ed. 1998).
40. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 101-1411.
41. See id. § 706(d). Ten percent of the members may bring the action,
whether or not the not-for-profit corporation entitles its members to vote for the
board of directors. See id.
42. Id. § 714(c) (emphasis added).
43. See id. §§ 706(d), 714(c). In either circumstance, the N-PCL also provides
for the removal of an officer or director by the board of directors with or without
cause. Id. §§ 706, 714.
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in a derivative action,' a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or a
judgment creditor thereof may bring an action of misconduct
against an officer or director.45 An officer or director of a not-for-
profit corporation may be held liable for breaching his or her
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. 6
The duty of care requires officers and directors to use
reasonable care in performing their duties, as described in section
717(a) of the N-PCL: "[d]irectors and officers shall discharge the
duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that
degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men
would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." 7
The N-PCL allows officers and directors to rely upon certain
experts in performing their duties in good faith.4'
Under the duty of loyalty, officers and directors must pursue
the interests and mission of the not-for-profit corporation with
undivided allegiance, placing the interests of the entity above any
44. See id. § 623(a) (stating that 5% of a corporation's members, holders of
capital certificates or owners of a beneficial interest may bring an action against
an officer).
45. See id. § 720(b). In addition, "[i]f the certificate of incorporation or the
by-laws [of the not-for-profit corporation] so provide ... any holder of a
subvention certificate or any other contributor to the [not-for-profit corporation]
of cash or property of the value of $1,000 or more" may also procure such an
action. Id. § 720(b)(4). In the event of a not-for-profit corporation with no
members, a director may bring an action against third parties to obtain a
judgment in favor of the not-for-profit corporation. See id. § 720(c). In such
circumstances:
The complaint shall set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to
secure the initiation of such action by the board or the reason for not making
such efforts. The court in its discretion shall determine whether it is in the
interest of the corporation that the action be maintained, and if the action is
successful in whole or in part, what reimbursement if any should be made out of
the corporate treasury to the plaintiff for his reasonable expenses including
attorney's fees, incurred in the prosecution of the action.
Id.
46. See generally id. §§ 717, 720.
47. Id. § 717(a).
48. Id. § 717(b) (stating that as long as the reliance is in good faith, an officer
or director may rely on either another corporate employee whom he or she
believes to be competent and reliable in such matters, an outsider whom the
officer or director believes to be an expert in such matters, or a committee of the
board on which such officer or director does not serve).
2003]
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private interests.4 The N-PCL provides that officers and directors:
(i) must act in good faith;' (ii) must not receive loans from the
entity;' and (iii) must not engage in self-dealing transactions."
Pursuing the interest of a third person above that of the not-for-
profit corporation also violates this duty. 3
Under the common law duty of obedience, officers and
directors must adhere to the purposes of the not-for-profit
corporation and pursue its mission. 4 While the N-PCL does not
explicitly refer to this duty,55 certain N-PCL provisions allude to it."'
The N-PCL limits the activities of a not-for-profit corporation to
those set forth in the purpose clause of the certificate of
incorporation. The N-PCL also provides that officers and
directors serve as the corporate managers of the not-for-profit
corporation and carry forth its purpose." As a corollary to this
49. See S.H. & Helen R. Scheuer Family Found, Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582
N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (App. Div. 1992) ("[I]t is well established that, as fiduciaries,
board members bear a duty of loyalty to the corporation and 'may not profit
improperly at the expense of their corporation."') (citing Turner v. Am. Metal
Co., 50 N.Y.S.2d 800, 831 (1944), appeal dismissed 295 N.Y. 822 (1946)).
50. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a).
51. Id. § 716 (stating that other than the purchase of bonds, debentures or
similar obligations customarily sold in public offerings, no loans should be made
by a not-for-profit corporation to its directors, officers, or any entity in which one
of its officers or members has a substantial financial interest).
52. Id. §§ 406(a)(2), 715. Section 406 of the N-PCL provides that a not-for-
profit corporation "shall not engage in any act or self-dealing which is subject to
tax under section 4941 [of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code]." Id. § 406. Section
406 applies to those not-for-profit corporations classified as "private
foundations" under section 509 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Id.
53. Collins v. Beinecke, 67 N.Y.2d 479, 483 (1986).
54. See generally Alco Gravure, Inc. v. The Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752
(N.Y. 1985) (stating that the board has a duty to apply funds within the
framework of the N-PCL).
55. Office of the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, The
Regulatory Role of the Attorney General's Charity Bureau, at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
56. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 201, 202. Section 201 sets forth the
types and purposes of not-for-profit corporations. Section 202 provides that not-
for-profit corporations "shall have power in furtherance of its corporate
purposes" and sets forth such default powers. Id. § 202(a).
57. Id.
58. Id. §§ 701, 713. Section 701 provides that a not-for-profit corporation
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duty, officers and directors must also ensure the entity conducts its
activities in a lawful manner."
Although the N-PCL does not expressly refer to the business
judgment rule, courts nonetheless apply the business judgment rule
to the decisions of not-for-profit corporation officers and
directors.' The business judgment rule forecloses a court from
inquiring into the decisions of corporate actors, so long as such
actions were disinterested and honest.6 The purpose of this rule is
to allow officers and directors to take legitimate business risks
without subjecting their decision-making to judicial scrutiny.62
Thus, when an officer or director "fail[s] to possess the
independence and disinterested status which is a prerequisite to
insulation from liability by virtue of the business judgment rule,"
such protection is unavailable.63
The N-PCL provides that an aggrieved plaintiff may pursue
the remedies of accounting, rescission, and an injunction in a
"shall be managed by its board of directors." Id. § 701(a). Furthermore:
If the certificate of incorporation vests the management of the [not-for-profit
corporation], in whole or in part, in one or more persons other than the board,
individually or collectively, such other person or persons shall be subject to the
same obligations and the same liabilities for managerial acts or omissions as are
imposed upon directors ....
Id. § 701(b). Section 713 governs the authority of officers, stating:
All officers as between themselves and the corporation shall have such
authority and perform such duties in the management of the [not-for-profit
corporation] as may be provided in the by-laws or, to the extent not so
provided, by the board. The board may require any officer to give security for
the faithful performance of his duties.
Id. § 713(e).
59. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 717 F. Supp. 188, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding officers and directors of not-for-profit corporation liable for
unpaid withholding taxes as responsible persons involved in day-to-day business
operations).
60. See S.H. & Helen R. Scheuer Family Found, Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582
N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (App. Div. 1992) ("[T]he rule will govern only where such
decision making, although perhaps misguided, has been honest and disinterested
and the doctrine will not be enforced when the good faith or oppressive conduct
of the officers and directors is in issue.").
61. See 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 669; see also Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276
N.Y. 215, 220 (1937).
62. See 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
63. Id. at 663.
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misconduct action against an officer or director.' A plaintiff may
compel an accounting if an officer or director neglected, failed to
perform, or otherwise violated his or her "duties in the
management.., of [the not-for-profit corporation] assets," or if
such person acquired, transferred, lost, or wasted entity assets due
to a derogation of duty. If the plaintiff demonstrates the officer
or director knew of the unlawfulness of a conveyance, assignment,
or transfer of corporate assets, a court may set aside that unlawful
act. 6  Finally, a court may also enjoin a prospective conveyance,
assignment, or transfer of not-for-profit corporation assets if there
are reasonable grounds that an unlawful transfer will be made.
In certain circumstances, the N-PCL provides immunity for
officers and directors. An unpaid officer or director of a not-for-
profit corporation that qualifies as a 501(c)(3) organization under
the U.S. Internal Revenue Code may raise an immunity defense.
The purpose of this qualified immunity is to reduce the burden of
expensive liability insurance by shielding persons serving qualifying
not-for-profit corporations without compensation. Such officers
or directors must raise this defense before the service of answers."
Nonetheless, this immunity is not available if the officer or director
acts in a manner that is grossly negligent or intended to cause the
harm to the complaining party.'
C. Criminal Penalties
In cases involving particularly egregious conduct or specific
64. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
65. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 720 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (McKinney
2001).
66. See id. § 720(a)(2).
67. See id. § 720(a)(3).
68. See id. § 720(a); see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002) (defining 501(c)(3)
corporations as organizations operated solely for, among other specified aims,
religious and charitable purposes).
69. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(a).
70. See Woodford v. Benedict Cmty. Health Ctr., 575 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416
(App. Div. 1991) (holding that defendants cannot claim immunity from liability
under Internal Revenue Code section 501 unless they raised it prior to their
answers).
71. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(a).
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statutory violations, law enforcement agencies may bring criminal
actions against officers or directors of not-for-profit corporations] 2
For example, on February 6, 2002, AG Eliot Spitzer announced the
indictments of Lorraine Hale and her husband, Jesse DeVore, for
stealing over $700,000 from the Hale House Foundation." The
seventy-count indictment included charges of grand larceny,
forgery, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal
possession of a forged instrument. Spitzer also obtained a court
order freezing the assets of Hale and DeVore.75 The indictment
alleges:
Money raised under the well-respected Hale House name to
fulfill its mission of caring for children born addicted to illegal
drugs and/or afflicted with AIDS was instead used to pay Hale's
property taxes, to install a Jacuzzi in her home, to pay her
brother's legal expenses and to fund her husband's theatrical
production.
Spitzer also commenced a civil forfeiture action to recover $1
million alleged to have been stolen. Spitzer settled with Hale and
DeVore for $766,000 and five years probation.78
Certain regulatory schemes also penalize officers and directors
for the unlawful acts of the not-for-profit corporation. 9  For
72. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
73. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, Lorraine Hale and Husband Indicted for Stealing Hale House Funds
(Feb. 6, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hale Press Release]; see also
Heidi Evans & Dave Saltonstall, Indictments in Hale Scandal Ex-Chief Hubby
Charged with Theft, Forgery, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 6, 2002, at 2 [hereinafter
Hale Article].
74. See Hale Press Release, supra note 73.
75. See Hale Article supra note 73.
76. See Hale Press Release, supra note 73.
77. See id.
78. Shelter Founder's Daughter Sentenced, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 2002, at 14.
The couple faced up to fifteen years in prison if convicted on all charges. See
Darch Gregorian, No Jail for Hale in Charity Rip-Off, N.Y. POST Oct. 25, 2002, at
21 ("[T]he husband and wife have returned about $125,000 to Hale House so far,
which is their life savings, and are trying to come up with the rest of the cash.").
79. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1036-37 (1991).
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example, in People v. Pymm, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions of officers of a corporation for criminal
activity related to the mercury contamination of the workplace.'
Officers and directors of not-for-profit corporations, as well as
BCs, are also vulnerable to criminal and other penalties with
regard to employment,8' environmental,82  antitrust, 3  and
intellectual property' laws and regulations.
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Among the most litigated and least understood issues in
corporate law, piercing is an equitable remedy developed by courts
to hold individuals responsible for acts commissioned by a
corporation." Justice Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of
Appeals in 1927, lamented that piercing is "enveloped in the mists
of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it."86 Commentators have since echoed this sentiment, as phrases
such as "Alter Ego" and "Instrumentality" developed to describe
piercing testsY All too frequently, however, these "tests" prove to
80. People v. Pymm, 76 N.Y.2d 511, 525 (1991). Although the court upheld
the convictions of the officers of for-profit entities, it does not appear that the
result would have been different if the entity were not-for-profit. Id. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted "to assure so far as possible
that every working man and woman in the Nation [have access to] safe and
healthful working conditions." Id. at 517 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Violations of this act leading to criminal penalties typically involve the serious
injury or death of an employee. Id.
81. See N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 198(a), 198(c) (McKinney 2001).
82. See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1994).
83. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.22
(1984) ("There is no doubt that the sweeping language of Section 1 [of the
Sherman Act] applies to nonprofit entities.") (emphasis added).
84. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Metrological Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp.
1390, 1402 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding corporate officers liable for their torts even
while acting officially).
85. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1036-37 (1991).
86. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1036 (citing Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.
Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)).
87. Professor Blumberg described the litany of piercing cases as
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be result-oriented and offer little in the form of constructive
analysis."
A. Rationale
A corporation exists independent of its owners as a separate
legal entity." A corporation's distinct legal existence insulates its
shareholders from liability: shareholders of a corporation are liable
only for the amount of their investments and not for the debts of
the corporation itself.' Courts will only pierce in the unusual
circumstance, to prevent fraud, achieve equity or avert the
violation of a statute or public policy." Under the piercing
doctrine, courts may hold liable corporate actors who misuse the
corporate form in such a manner as to accomplish their own
personal affairs rather than that of the business of the
corporation."
"irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible." Id. at 1037 (citing PHILLIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983)). Professor Landers
characterized the case law as "def[ying] any attempt at rational explanation." Id.
(citing Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary &
Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589, 620 (1975)). Finally,
Judge Easterbrook remarked that piercing decisions occur "freakishly." Id.
(citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability & the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985)). With such welcoming
introductions to the field from some of the most respected figures therein, this
Article will attempt, nonetheless, to rationally explain such a freakish,
irreconcilable and overly metaphoric doctrine.
88. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1036-38.
89. See Mark S. Cohen, Grounds for Disregarding the Corporate Entity and
Piercing the Corporate Veil, in 45 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS
3d § 1 (1998).
90. Id. § 2.
91. See JOHN BLYTH ET AL., 14 NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS § 37 (2nd ed. 1996). It should be noted that a plaintiff typically
has several alternative grounds for imposing substantive liability upon individuals
or corporations in the piercing context, including civil conspiracy, estoppel, fraud,
agency, the trust fund doctrine, fraudulent transfer, the denuding theory, breach
of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. See Cohen, supra note 89, § 1. This
Article will address only the piercing remedy.
92. See, e.g., Semigran Enters. v. Noren, 730 N.Y.S.2d 586 (App. Div. 2001)
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Piercing most frequently occurs in the context of a close
corporation, due to the usually small number of shareholders.93
Courts rarely pierce the corporate veil against a large corporation
and, even then, generally do so only to reach the parent
corporation of a defendant subsidiary.94
B. Tests
Courts have developed many tests95 to determine piercing
liability, primarily focusing upon the relationship between the
controlling person(s) of the corporation and the corporation itself.96
1. Alter Ego
Under the Alter Ego test, the separate existence of the
corporation shall be disregarded if: (i) the corporation is so
influenced by the controlling person(s) that there is such unity of
both ownership and interest that the separateness of the
corporation has ceased and (ii) adherence to the separate
corporate existence would perpetuate a fraud or promote
(relieving defendant Lawrence B. Semigran from individual liability since the
claim against him contained no particularized allegations regarding his use of
Semigran Enterprises as his corporate alter ego and, therefore, failed to set forth
a basis on which Semigran could be held individually liable).
93. Thompson, supra note 79, at 1038-39.
94. Id. (noting "[piercing] is contextual. Most significantly, piercing occurs
only in close corporations or within corporate groups; it does not occur in public
corporations.").
95. Commentators and courts alike utilize the terms "tests" and "theories"
interchangeably to refer to the factors or considerations employed in determining
whether to pierce. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 89, § 6(B) ("Most jurisdictions
employ a number of theories or multi-pronged tests in analyzing piercing
situations and have articulated specific factors in determining whether a
particular prong has been satisfied.") (emphasis added). Professor Cohen then
lists the major "tests" employed by various jurisdictions, illustrating "[t]he
decision to present.., these theories is somewhat arbitrary because the line
between what is a theory and what is merely a factor is somewhat nebulous." Id.
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, for the purposes of clarity, this Article will refer
to the alternate methods of piercing as tests rather than theories.
96. Thompson, supra note 79, at 1071.
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injustice.97  The rationale of the Alter Ego test is: "if the
shareholders themselves disregard the separation of the corporate
enterprise, the law will also disregard it so far as necessary to
protect individual and corporate creditors.""
2. Instrumentality
Under the Instrumentality test, the distinct corporate existence
of a subsidiary in relation to its parent entity shall be disregarded
if: (i) complete domination existed in respect to the attacked
transaction so that the distinct corporate entity had no separate
mind, will, or existence of its own [instrumentality element]; (ii)
defendant used such that domination to commit fraud or wrong
[improper purpose element]; and (iii) such domination and breach
of duty must proximately cause the loss or unjust injury [proximate
97. Cohen, supra note 89, § 7; see also Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d
270, 272 (Tex. 1986) (indicating alter ego liability "is shown from the total
dealings of the corporation and the individual, including [i] the degree to which
corporate formalities have been followed and corporate and individual property
have been kept separately, [ii] the amount of financial interest, ownership and
control the individual maintains over the corporation, and [iii] whether the
corporation has been used for personal purposes."). The particularly liberal
piercing application of the Texas Supreme Court in Castleberry spurred the Texas
Legislature to enact limitations to a shareholder's liability for fraud due to a
corporation's contractual obligations "unless the obligee demonstrates that the
[shareholder] caused the corporation to be used [for] actual fraud... primarily
for the direct personal benefit of the [shareholder]." Thompson, supra note 79, at
1042 (citing TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21A(2) (Vernon 1991)).
Nonetheless, courts commonly consider such factors in the Alter Ego test. See,
e.g., Cohen, supra note 89, § 7. Federal common law follows an alternative Alter
Ego test, the unity-of-interest test. See White v. Midwest Office Tech., 5 F. Supp.
2d 936, 956-57 (D. Kan. 1998) (ruling in favor of defendant as plaintiff failed to
show that the personalities and assets of the corporation and shareholder were
sufficiently blurred or that the defendant misused the corporate form in order to
perpetrate fraud, evade existing allegations, or circumvent the law). The unity-
of-interest test provides that the corporate fiction should be ignored if: (i) there
was such a unity of interest given to the separate identity of the corporation by its
shareholders that the assets and personality of the corporation and such
individuals are indistinct and (ii) adherence to such corporate fiction would
promote fraud, injustice or lead to an evasion of legal obligations. Id.
98. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 (quoting BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
294 (1946)).
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cause element].99 Since the dominant corporation misused the
subservient corporation as a corporate fiction for its own purposes,
the rationale of the Instrumentality test is to hold the dominant
corporation responsible for such conduct.'"
3. Equity
Courts dissatisfied with both the Alter Ego and
Instrumentality tests have fashioned their own equitable tests that
focus upon the distinct factors in a given case."' Courts consider
several factors,' 2 including: (i) undercapitalization; (ii) failure to
observe the formalities of corporate existence; (iii) nonpayment or
overpayment of dividends; (iv) siphoning off of funds by the
dominant shareholder; and (v) guarantee of corporate liabilities by
a majority of shareholders. 3
4. Public Policy
Some courts will pierce when the defendant utilized the
corporate form to violate a statute, perpetuate a fraud, or violate
other public policy."°  The improper conduct may involve
discharging unwanted obligations by creating new business entities
with the same controlling persons while hindering the ability of the
previous entity to pay off its debts.' 5 Another likely application of
this test involves attempts to avoid compliance with environmental,
employment, and antitrust regulations.Y Typically, a company
facing liability for violation of a regulatory statute attempts to
avoid it by liquidating and the regulatory entity will pursue the
99. Cohen, supra note 89, § 8.
100. Id.
101. See id. §9.
102. Although proponents of this Equity test disfavor the Alter Ego theory,
the factors considered under both tests are very similar. Cf. sources cited supra
note 97 and accompanying text.
103. Cf. supra note 97.
104. See Cohen, supra note 89, §§ 9-10.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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controlling individual(s)."°
Although these four alternative piercing tests are phrased
differently and have different elements, each test focuses upon
essentially similar conduct to achieve an equitable result.' 8 The
tests also assume, thus far, that the liability flows from the
corporation to the controlling person(s) (or entities)." However,
under other circumstances equity may require that liability flow in
the opposite direction."0
C. Inter-Affiliate Liability
Suppose an individual shields his assets in a corporation to
avoid personal liability."' The piercing remedy empowers an
aggrieved plaintiff to hold the individual responsible for the
obligations of the corporation; notwithstanding, here, the creditor
needs to reach the assets of the corporation to satisfy the debts of
an individual and the piercing remedial claim is insufficient to
reach the assets shielded by the corporation."' Reverse piercing
and triangular piercing allow the creditor to reach those assets of
the corporation or even other affiliated corporations."'
1. Reverse Piercing
Reverse piercing occurs when a court holds a controlled
corporation, which has been misused as the alter ego or
instrumentality of a shareholder, liable for the debts of that
controlling shareholder." ' In C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd.
Partnership, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
107. Id. § 9.
108. Id. §§ 7-11.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 6 (allowing plaintiff to reverse pierce in order to reach assets that
individuals have sheltered in a corporation).
111. See C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight LP, 111 F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 (E.D. Va.
2000).
112. Id. at 740.
113. Id.
114. Gary J. Mennitt, Reverse & Triangular Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 223
N.Y. L.J. 53 (2000) (discussing applications of reverse piercing).
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Virginia considered the applicability of the reverse piercing
remedy."5 There, the plaintiff sought to enforce a debt against the
limited partnership ' 16 of an individual defendant and his general
partners 7 and argued that both the limited partnership and its
general partners were alter egos of the defendant."' Citing the
acceptance of reverse piercing cases throughout the country, Judge
Ellis observed, "the rationale for traditional piercing operates with
equal force in support of reverse piercing."".. The court thereby
allowed plaintiff's piercing claim to proceed.
Allowing the piercing to reach from the corporation to the
controlling person, but not from the controlling person to the
corporation ' would hinder commercial activity." If reverse
piercing claims are not recognized, "an individual could abuse the
115. C.F. Trust, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
116. See id. at 740 n.11 (noting that although piercing "typically focuses on the
corporate form, it is settled that the doctrine also applies to limited
partnerships.").
117. See id. at 744 (refusing to apply the alter ego analysis to other individuals
and stating, "it is clear that an individual cannot be the alter ego of another
individual."). But see In re Bohrer, 145 F.3d 1323, 1998 WL 228198 at *4 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that an individual was an alter ego of another individual).
118. C.F. Trust, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 734. U.S. District Court Judge Ellis stated:
This case is by no means the first suit by the plaintiffs claiming [the defendant]
has taken steps to evade the payment [of his debts] and to defraud his creditors.
To the contrary, this case is merely the latest chapter in an ongoing saga. So
voluminous is the litigation involving these parties that only a summary is
presented in the margins.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations to eleven reported cases omitted).
119. Id. at 741.
120. Id. at 744.
121. Id. at 740. Judge Ellis described two types of reverse piercing claims.
Outsider reverse piercing actions involve an attempt by an outside creditor to
reach the assets of a corporation to satisfy the debts of a corporate insider. Id.
Insider reverse piercing claims are an attempt by a dominant shareholder to
disregard the corporate fiction so as to permit such insider to raise corporate
claims against a third party. Id. at 740 n.12.
122. See id. at 741. The court maintained:
When [the corporate] form is abused, courts, in appropriate circumstances, may
disregard the fiction. And, in these circumstances, this should be so, on
principle, whether the fiction is misused to shield the owner's assets from claims
against the corporation [piercing] or to shield the corporation's assets from
claims against the owner [reverse piercing].
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corporate or limited partnership forms with impunity so as to
evade personal obligations and to hinder the collection of valid
judgments. 1 23 The court noted, however, the only time such an
application would result in an inequitable result is in the context of
a corporation with multiple shareholders because, as non-culpable
parties, such shareholders would suffer for the action of another
shareholder. 1
4
2. Triangular Piercing
Triangular piercing occurs when a controlled corporation is
held liable for the debts of an affiliated corporation, through an
intermediary controlling shareholder."z  The liability flows in a
triangle, first from the controlled corporation to the controlling
shareholder, then from the controlling shareholder to the affiliated
corporation. 6 The following diagram depicts the remedial claims
of piercing, reverse piercing and triangular piercing.
123. Id. at 741.
124. Id. at 741 n.16; cf. supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing
the primary application of the piercing remedy in actions against closely held
corporations).
125. Mennitt, supra note 114.
126. Id.
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3. Diagram: Piercing the Corporate Veil-Reverse and Triangular
Piercing
PERSON
Reverse Piercing Triangular Piercing
* PERSON signifies the controlling shareholder or entity.
+ CORP signifies the controlled entity.
The ARROWS signify the flow of liability.
Piercing: liability flows from the controlled entity to the
controlling individual.
Reverse Piercing: liability flows from the controlling
individual to the controlled entity.
Triangular Piercing: liability flows from the first controlled
entity to the controlling individual, then from the controlling
individual to the second controlled entity.
Triangular Piercing = Piercing + Reverse Piercing
4. Critical Observations
Judge Posner suggested that reverse and triangular piercing
claims should apply essentially to cases of misrepresentation. 7 He
127. Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43
U. CHi. L. REv. 499, 520 (1976); see also Mennitt, supra note 114 and
accompanying text (discussing Judge Posner's analysis of reverse and triangular
piercing remedies).
Piercing
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provided an example in which a bank holding company chooses a
similar name for its real estate subsidiary.1" The real estate
subsidiary leases office space in the bank, so that it appears to be
within the office of the bank. 2' Assuming they are dealing with the
bank, unsuspecting creditors extend generous terms to the real
estate company.3 ' It would thus be appropriate to forbid the bank
from denying that it is the entity to which the creditors extended
credit.3'
However, Judge Posner cautioned that reverse (and
triangular) piercing claims should be allowed discriminately. In
this scenario, a taxi company incorporates each taxicab separately
for the purpose of limiting its exposure to tort liability from
accident victims.'32 Separate incorporation serves to externalize the
costs of taxicab service."' Permitting accident victims to pierce
here would create an inefficiency: investors would not be able to
limit their liability.' Therefore, investment in taxi service thereby
would be unattractive and the affiliated entities of the taxi service
would suffer increased information costs."' Implicitly, investment
128. Posner, supra note 127, at 521.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (observing that "[t]o protect the legal separateness of affiliated
corporations in this case would lead creditors as a class to invest a socially
excessive amount in determining the true corporate status of the entity to which
they were asked to extend credit.")
132. Id.
133. Id. Judge Posner maintained:
The separate incorporation of the taxicabs increases the risk that the taxi
company will default on its tort obligations. If this were a negotiated obligation
the creditor-victim would charge a higher interest rate to reflect the increased
risk, but it is not, negotiations between the taxi company and the accident
victims before the accident being infeasible.
Id.
134. Id. at 520.
135. Id. at 521. Judge Posner considered the alternative of insurance
coverage, but the insurance company could become insolvent, exclude particular
torts in coverage policies, etc. Id. In this particular circumstance, the most viable
solution appeared to be preserving the limited liability of the taxi company but
requiring it to post a bond in the amount of the highest tort recovery estimate. Id.
Under this solution, "[s]hareholders would be protected; accident costs would be
internalized; and the information costs of the creditors of affiliated corporations
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in taxi service would become a speculative venture and the price of
taxi service would necessarily increase.
Judge Posner distinguished these scenarios above and
explained that the creditors of the bank through contract were
voluntary creditors and the creditors of the taxi cab through tort
were involuntary creditors and then suggested an alternative
method to pierce.'36 Posner would implement an objective test and
look to what a reasonable person in place of the aggrieved creditor
would have thought. '37 Considering information costs would
differentiate the more sophisticated creditors from involuntary
creditors.'38  If "creditors are [reasonably] misled by the
proliferation of affiliated corporations, the misrepresentation
principle affords them a remedy. If they are not [reasonably]
misled, the proliferation of corporations is harmless and should be
ignored."'39
D. Piercing Approach in New York
In State v. Easton, the New York Supreme Court
acknowledged many of these critical observations regarding the
overly formalistic language of the piercing tests and articulated a
potential new direction for New York case law.'" There, Karl
Easton ("Easton") served as the President of Cobble Hill Center
Corp. and 3 Lafayette Avenue (collectively, "Easton Corps.") and
as Medical Director of Brooklyn Psychosocial Rehabilitation
Institute ("BPRI"), a New York not-for-profit corporation."'
Easton's infant children owned all the shares of Easton Corps.' 2
would be minimized." Id.
136. Id. at 522-24.
137. Id. at 522; cf. sources cited supra notes 94-113 and accompanying text
(focusing upon the actions of the debtor and the degree of egregiousness in his or
her conduct).
138. Posner, supra note 127, at 522-23 ("[a] financial creditor, such as a
consortium of banks, can discover the true financial situation of the debtor at a
lower cost than the trade creditor, and the latter in turn at lower cost than the
non-business creditor.").
139. Id. at 524.
140. State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
141. Id. at 906.
142. Id. Easton's children owned all the shares of Cobble Hill Center Corp.,
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Easton Corps. leased properties to BPRI, which ran facilities for
the mentally ill funded by Medicaid and Social Security.43 In 1986,
the state of New York charged BPRI and the Easton Corps. with
defrauding Medicaid.'" After a non-jury trial and appeal, the state
entered judgment against Easton for $7,573,703.' 45 The Second
Department dismissed all other charges against BPRI and the
Easton Corps.'46
which in turn owned all the shares of 3 Lafayette Avenue. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The State charged that BPRI, Easton and the Easton Corps.
defrauded Medicaid by "improperly billing for 'home visit' services that were not
reimbursable under the regulations of the New York State Office of Mental
Health, or not performed." Id.
145. Id. The sum represented the Medicaid fraud proceeds plus treble
damages. Id.
146. Id. at 907. The Second Department held Easton liable, apart from BPRI
and the Easton Corps., on a fraud theory, as Judge Joseph Harris of the Supreme
Court narrated:
The claims against [BPRI and the Easton Corps.] for the fraudulent "home
visit" payments were dismissed. This is an obvious result of the fact that the
initial fraud perpetuated by Easton-the "home visit" fraud-was what might
be determined an "operating" fraud, designed and supervised by Easton and
implemented by the operating company BPRI. In this initial fraud, [the Easton
Corps.] did not participate. It was a subsequent or secondary fraud that the
realty corporations participated in-the concealment and laundering of the
fraudulent proceeds obtained by the "home visit" fraud, and the shielding of
these proceeds, as well as the personal assets of [Easton] and his wife, from
recoupment from the State. Not only were [the Easton Corps.] a laundry for
"dirty" proceeds, they were a bank in which to hide these proceeds during the
cleansing process.
Id. (emphasis added). This is quite a creative way to explain how the Second
Department, without resorting to a piercing analysis, held Easton personally
liable and then Easton Corps. liable.
The Second Department held Easton personally liable under Social Services
Law, Section 145(b)(2), which places personal liability on an individual who
"knowingly by means of a false statement or representation, or by deliberate
concealment of any material fact" obtains public funds, "on behalf of himself or
others." People v. BPRI, 585 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (App. Div. 1992). The court
commented that "this fraud inured to the benefit of Easton and his
family.., because Easton himself was controlling the bargaining on both sides of
the bargaining table, in his not-for-profit capacity as Medical Director of BPRI,
and his for-profit role as [equitable] owner of [the Easton Corps]." Id.
Although neither Judge Harris nor the Second Department expressly
characterized the relief as a triangular pierce, Easton involved a triangular pierce
2003] 473
474 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
The State then procured an action in the Supreme Court to
enforce the judgment against the Easton Corps. through Easton.' 7
The enforcement action involved a reverse piercing claim because
the State attempted to hold the Easton Corps. liable for the debts
of Easton. ' Judge Harris began by prudently ascertaining "[t]here
appears to be a consensus that the [piercing] analysis does not
differ as between a [piercing] claim framed on an instrumentality
[test] and one framed on an alter ego [test]."'49
The court next stated that it would be inequitable not to allow
a reverse pierce, even though Easton did not himself have equity in
Easton Corps.5° The court concluded by holding Easton Corps.
liable for the debts of Easton and explained- "[n]either the
corporate concept nor the corporate form was ever intended to
enable the commission of the 'perfect crime."""' Easton
summarizes the New York approach with the piercing doctrine and
anticipates the application so proposed in this Article.
As the leading commercial center in the United States, New
York produces the most piercing cases.'52 New York piercing cases
are somewhat more restrictive than such cases from the rest of the
country.'53 New York employs what some commentators view as a
because the liability flowed from BPRI to Easton, then from Easton to the
Easton Corps.
147. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
148. Id. It is interesting that Judge Harris acknowledged the reverse piercing
analysis that led to the reverse piercing claim. That is, the liability initiated with
BPRI and flowed to Easton. See cases cited supra note 146 (comparing Judge
Harris' "levels of fraud" analysis to the apparent triangular piercing claim).
149. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
150. Id. at 909. The court did not dwell on the concept of equitable
ownership, except to mention in passing that "[c]omplete domination of the
corporation is the key to [piercing], especially when the owners, legal or
equitable, use the corporation as a mere device for their personal rather than
legitimate corporate business." Id. (emphasis added). But see infra notes 161-63
and accompanying text.
151. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
152. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1052.
153. Id. Of 212 reported piercing cases through 1985, New York courts
pierced in seventy-four cases (34.91% of the time), compared with a national
average of 40.18%. Id. at 1051. Out of eleven piercing cases, Delaware did not
pierce a single time, while Kansas pierced fifteen out of nineteen piercing cases.
Id.
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stringent standard to pierce.5
The New York Court of Appeals set forth the modern piercing
standard in Morris v. New York State Dep't of Taxation and
Finance.155  The court began to elicit the standard by first
recognizing that "because a decision whether to [pierce] in a given
instance will necessarily depend on the attendant facts and
equities, the New York cases may not be reduced to definitive
rules governing the varying circumstances when the power may be
exercised."'56 Piercing, nonetheless, requires a showing that, "(i)
the owners exercised complete domination of the corporation in
respect to the attacked transaction; and (ii) that such domination
was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which
resulted in plaintiff's injury."'57
Under the first element, the complaining party must
demonstrate complete domination, indicating that the controlling
person(s) used the corporation as a mere mechanism to further
personal rather than corporate interests.'58 The complaining party
154. See, e.g., Richard H. Wagner, Parsing New York's Stringent Rules on
Piercing the Corporate Veil, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1991 (Outside Counsel), at 1
(discussing the heavy requirements that must be met in New York before a court
will apply the piercing doctrine).
155. Morris v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 603 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y.
1993) (stating that piercing requires a showing that plaintiff's injury resulted from
owners' use of their complete control of the corporation with respect to the
transaction to commit a wrong against the plaintiff).
156. Id. at 810.
157. Id. at 810-11. Such formulation contains language of the Alter Ego and
Instrumentality tests. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
158. Morris, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 807. A court will consider the following factors
in ascertaining complete control:
(1) disregard of the corporate formalities; (2) inadequate capitalization; (3)
intermingling of funds; (4) overlap in ownership, officers, directors, and
personnel; (5) common office space, address and telephone numbers of
corporate entities; (6) the degree of discretion shown by the allegedly
dominated corporation; (7) whether the dealings between the entities are at
arms length; (7) whether the corporations are treated as independent profit
centers; (9) payment or guarantee of the corporation debts by the dominating
entity; and (10) intermingling of property between the entities.
Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1997)
(discussing the factors considered in precedent to evaluate the existence of
complete control); cf. sources cited supra notes 97, 99-103 and accompanying text
(reviewing other methods of evaluating "complete control").
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must then establish that the controlling person(s) perpetuated an
injustice or wrong against that party using such domination to the
extent that a court in equity should intervene.'59 The same factors
which govern a traditional piercing case also govern a reverse
piercing case. 6'
The only means by which a non-shareholder may be liable for
a piercing remedial claim is under the doctrine of equitable
ownership, by which a court may hold a person liable who does not
actually own equity in a controlled corporation.' Courts consider
a number of factors to determine whether a non-shareholder is an
equitable owner for piercing purposes, including de facto control
over the assets and affairs of the corporation, involvement of other
persons in the affairs of the corporation and representations the
non-shareholder made to the public and third parties regarding
ownership of assets and control of the corporation.'62 A court will
typically deem an individual to be an equitable owner when the
individual once had equity, but transferred it to a relative,'63 or
when a creditor is overly involved in a corporation's activities." '
The relevant portions of the New York Business Corporation
Law ("BCL"), governing the duties and liabilities of officers and
159. Morris, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
160. In re Vebeliunas, 2002 WL 115656 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2002). Thereby, the
same standard would apply to a triangular piercing claim. In Vebeliunas, Judge
Preska considered the applicability of piercing to trusts. Id. at *5. Citing to
authority in other jurisdictions, the court determined that New York law would
likely allow a piercing action against a trust. Id.
161. Lally v. Catskill Airways, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (App. Div. 1993)
(explaining how a defendant with no remaining equity interest in a corporation
might yet maintain sufficient control to be deemed the equitable owner);
Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting that an individual with sufficient control
over a corporation may be considered an "equitable owner"); see also supra note
124 (indicating that the Easton court considering a piercing claim against Easton
even though he did not own equity in the Easton Corps.).
162. Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1051-52.
163. See State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1995); see also supra
note 142 and accompanying text.
164. Freeman, 119 F.3d at 1051. In Freeman, the defendant creditor operated
the corporate entity as if it were his personal bank account, ignoring corporate
formalities-its shareholders and board of directors-and held himself out as the
controlling person of the corporation. Id.
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directors,'65 do not refer to the piercing remedy. Similarly, the New
York piercing case law seldom reference the BCL.'66 Therefore,
the statutory scheme would not necessarily foreclose the
application of piercing to not-for-profit corporations. Absent some
characteristic of a not-for-profit corporation that so differentiates it
from a BC,67 piercing should apply to a not-for-profit corporation
as to a for-profit corporation.
III. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CONSIDERATIONS
The prefix "not-for-profit" refers to the non-distribution
constraint of an entity. Not-for-profit entities may not distribute
dividends directly or through subterfuge; nonetheless, may
distribute reasonable compensation to members, officers and
directors for services rendered.6  All profit derived from
165. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 2001) (governing the duties of
directors of a BCL); cf. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney
2001); supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (explaining the duties governing
the directors of directors of a not-for-profit corporation); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 719 (governing the liability of directors of a BCL); Id. § 720 (governing
misconduct actions against directors and officers of a BCL); cf. N.Y. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720; supra notes 52, 65-68, 71 and accompanying text
(governing misconduct actions against directors and officers of a not-for-profit
corporation).
Interestingly, the last portion of each of the afore-referenced BCL
sections includes a statement indicating that "[t]his section shall not affect any
liability otherwise imposed by law .... ." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 717(b)(v),
719(4)(f), 720(c); see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 719(f) (containing
similar language that "[t]his section shall not affect any liability otherwise
imposed by law upon any officer or director.").
166. Supra note 37. On March 10, 2003 a Westlaw on-line "NY-CS-ALL"
database search retrieved only seventeen documents with the following inquiry:
"FT(PIERC! & "CORPORATE VEIL") & Fr("BCL")." All seventeen
documents contained both terms for references to alternative causes of action,
procedural devices, etc. Only one of these documents referred to either BCL
Sections 717, 719 or 720. See infra note 165. It did not refer to the BCL section,
however, to limit the scope of the piercing remedy. The inquiry: "FT(PIERCE!
& "CORPORATE VEIL")" produced over 400 documents. While the inquiry:
"FT("BCL §")" produced 211 documents.
167. Courts have not only applied piercing to BCs, but to partnerships and
trusts. See cases cited supra notes 115-16, 160 and accompanying text.
168. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 12-1(a).
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operations must be used for the purposes as set forth in the articles
of incorporation.'6' Furthermore, not-for-profit corporations do
not have equity holders in the same manner as BCs, partnerships
or other limited liability entities.Y
17
Notwithstanding this non-distribution constraint, not-for-profit
entities comprise a significant amount of the workforce and
generate significant revenuesY1 More than 1.2 million not-for-
profit entities are exempt from federal income taxes,"' such entities
also generate an estimated $1.1 trillion in revenues,' account for
over fifteen million people in the workplace74 and are a significant
force in the business of the country."5
Not-for-profit entities run the gamut from churches, sports
leagues, charities, social clubs, schools, and hospitals. 176 Charitable
organizations such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation
Army, the United Way, as well as special interest groups such as
the Federalist Society and the Star Trek Fan Club all count
themselves among the many not-for-profit entities. " Not-for-
profit entities provide many services and functions in society, most
notably serving as philanthropic vehicles.
Many not-for-profit entities facilitate the charitable character
of the human spirit by providing a means to organize, collect
donations, assemble volunteers, and provide charitable services.' 8
The vast majority of charitable organizations organize as not-for-
169. See HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND ASSOCIATIONS 5-6 (5th ed. 1988).
170. See id. at 5 (mentioning the "[p]resence or absence of equity shares is the
single clear feature distinguishing a [BC] from a [not-for-profit-corporation].")
(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
171. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law
and An Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 683 n.4 (1985).
172. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 12-1(a).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Fishman, supra note 171, at 657.
176. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 12-1(a). Not-for-profit entities
"range in size from organizations with billions of dollars of assets, such as
foundations and universities, to groups with virtually no resources, such as three-
person dance companies or Little Leagues." Fishman, supra note 178, at 618.
177. KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 39, § 12-1(a).
178. Fishman, supra note 171, at 622.
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profit entities.' 79  Indeed the budgets of U.S. philanthropic
organizations exceed the budgets of many nations.' To facilitate
the provision of such services, federal, state, and local governments
provide tax exemption to not-for-profit corporations under certain
circumnstances.'1
If a not-for-profit corporation satisfies certain criteria under
the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, it may be exempt from federal
income taxes and be eligible to receive tax deductible donations. 2
Further, if a not-for-profit corporation satisfies other standards
under state and local provisions, it may also qualify for exemption
from property, sales, use, income, and licensing taxes on the state
and local level. 8 3 Some commentators suggest that if tax-exempt
not-for-profit entities ceased to exist, the government would have
to spend tax dollars to fill the void left by their absence."l
A. Types of Not-for-Profit Corporations Organized Under New
York Law
Not-for-profit entities must first accede to the organizational
requirements set forth under state law. 5 New York organizes not-
for-profit corporations according to their function and purpose. 6
The four types of not-for-profit corporations under New York law
are subject to varying degrees of regulation. 7  Type A
179. See, e.g., OLECK, supra note 169, at 7 (noting that a charitable
corporation is necessarily a nonprofit corporation).
180. Id. at 4.
181. Fishman, supra note 171, at 637-38.
182. See generally id. at 212-35 (explaining the various ways these types of
entities can obtain tax-exemption and other tax benefits).
183. See generally id. at 345-72 (listing the state taxes from which these
organizations may be exempt generally and in specific states).
184. See OLECK, supra note 169, at 227 (opining that not-for-profit entities
"perform functions which would fall squarely on the government if private
volunteers were not willing to devote their time and energies to them. Thus, if
the exempt organizations ceased to exist, the government would have to spend
more tax dollars in order to fill the void left in society by their absence.").
185. See Fishman, supra note 171, at 659-60.
186. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 2001).
187. See Fishman, supra note 171, at 660. For general considerations on the
New York not-for-profit corporation statutory framework, see Hansmann, supra
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corporations are the least regulated type of not-for-profit
corporations and consist of members who are the primary
beneficiaries of these entities.188 Type A not-for-profit corporations
consist of those corporations formed for lawful non-pecuniary
purposes, including "civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal,
athletic, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and for a
professional, commercial, industrial, trade or service association." '189
Type B corporations are the most regulated entities and
consist of those entities most likely to be tax exempt under the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code." Type B not-for-profit corporations
consist of those entities formed for non-business purposes,
including "charitable, educational, religious, scientific, literary,
cultural or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."'91
If a corporation is formed for purposes contained within the
provisions of both Type A and Type B, the N-PCL classifies the
not-for-profit corporation as a Type B corporation.'92
Type C corporations are less regulated than Type B entities
and consist of those not-for-profit corporations formed "for any
lawful business purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public
objective."'93  An example of a Type C organization is a food
cooperative operating in a low-income community."' Any not-for-
profit corporation with a purpose listed under Type C shall be a
Type C entity.9
Finally, Type D corporations consist of those not-for-profit
corporations whose power of formation derives from another
enabling statute.96 These entities are eligible for financing from
local and state funds, such as those provided by the New York
Private Housing Finance Law.' Type D not-for-profit
note 32, at 530-35.
188. See Fishman, supra note 171, at 661.
189. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b).
190. Fishman, supra note 171, at 661.
191. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b).
192. Id. § 201(c).
193. Id. § 201(b) (emphasis added); Fishman, supra note 171, at 661.
194. Fishman, supra note 171, at 661.
195. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(c).
196. Id. § 201(b).
197. Fishman, supra note 171, at 662-63.
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corporations are subject to the regulation-level of Type B
entities. While New York classifies not-for-profit corporations
under four separate categories, the board of directors remains a
common element amongst these organizations. '99
B. Not-for-Profit Corporate Board
The governing entity of a not-for-profit corporation, the board
of directors, is in charge of the day-to-day activities of the
organization. 2' A board may be self-perpetuating or elected from
the membership of the entity.0' In either respect, the board of a
not-for-profit corporation differs from that of the BC.
22
Traditionally, not-for-profit board practices are much looser
than those of the BC. 3 There are no analogous reporting
requirements to outside agencies, such as is the case with public
corporations.2° Several checks aim to assure the fair practice of
BC boards, including the threat of derivative lawsuits combined
with an active plaintiff's bar, scrutiny of the financial press,
oversight by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and
other securities industry agencies and the responsibility of the
board to the shareholders. 5 In the not-for-profit corporation,
there are few if any such procedural safeguards.
26
Outside monitoring of not-for-profit corporations is largely
performed by the mainstream media, but stories tend to surface
only in extreme cases. 7 The Charities Bureau of the New York
198. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(c).
199. See id. § 201.
200. OLECK, supra note 169, at 743.
201. 18 NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE 2D CHARITIES § 74 (2d ed. 1999).
202. See Fishman, supra note 171, at 674-78
203. See id. at 675.
204. See id. at 674-75.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 674.
207. See Interview by Bill O'Reilly with Randy Daniels, New York Secretary
of State, The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast, Oct. 23, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 5081827 (commenting that "[I]ess than 10 percent of the
$1.4 billion raised [by the combined 160 9-11 charities] has been paid out.");
Heidi Evans & Dave Saltonstall, Hale Blew $50OG on Hubby's Play[,J Lied
About Loan, Said It Was Used to Fix Up House, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 8, 2001,
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AG's office has limited resources to devote to over 40,000 entities
under its watch.28 Therefore, the level of conduct necessary to
trigger an investigation with the AG is typically egregious.2"
While board positions in both not-for-profit corporations and
BCs may be prestigious, not-for-profit corporation board members
typically have no experience, are unpaid, and are unaware of their
duties and responsibilities. 2"0  Not-for-profit board memberships
are prestigious due to contacts made with prominent individuals
and a general interest in the provision of charitable services.21'
Many members of the board serve at the behest of in-house
director employees. 12 Such directors serve as tokens, with little
experience or conception of the duties and expectations of their
positions."3 The frequent lack of sufficient oversight and the
inherent structural flaws of the not-for-profit corporation may
present opportunities for not-for-profit board members to abuse
their positions.2"'
IV. PIERCING APPLIED TO NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTITIES
A number of jurisdictions allow an aggrieved party to apply
the equitable remedy of piercing to a not-for-profit entity.2' The
experiences of these jurisdictions provide insight into the suitability
of the piercing remedy in the not-for-profit corporation context.
available at 2001 WL 17950407. For other notable scandals reported by the press,
see Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home Front" for Charitable
Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1999).
208. Thomas Adcock, Charities Bureau Caught in Spotlight, 227 N.Y. L.J. 16
(2002) (mentioning the Bureau has only seventeen attorneys and six
accountants).
209. Id. (quoting Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who said "[w]ith more than
40,000 charities filing with us, six accountants can hardly do even rudimentary
analysis, or even a cursory examination to look for red flags.").
210. Fishman, supra note 171, at 674-75.
211. Id. at 674.
212. Id. at 674-75.
213. Id.
214. See sources cited supra notes 207-12.
215. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A. Jurisdictions Recognizing Piercing in Not-for-Profit Context
In Macaluso v. Jenkins, an Illinois appellate court held that the
status of an entity as not-for-profit does not foreclose the
application of piercing as an equitable remedy."6 There, the
defendant utilized a non-profit corporation for his own personal
gain by drawing its funds for his personal and business use,
commingled its assets with his own and contracted under the non-
profit organization to supply services to his for-profit business and
did so despite his status as merely one of six directors of the non-
profit entity.217 The court dismissed the argument that piercing
could not apply because Illinois statutory law does not authorize
the remedy.218 The court reasoned piercing is an equitable remedy,
which "completely disregards th[e] statutory network creating and
supporting corporate structures." '219 The Illinois court effectively
discerned that what works for the corporation should also work for
the not-for-profit entity.2 The court then held the defendant
personally liable for the debts of the non-profit corporation."
In Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia held that piercing applied to a private
foundation.2 In the case, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the
federal government to encourage the enforcement of unfair
banking laws. 3 The federal government moved for attorneys fees
under the False Claims Act.2 The plaintiff formed a not-for-profit
foundation because he had been personally barred from suing
personally, under the doctrine of res judicata.' The judge noted
that "a 'foundation' and its 'trustee' are.., legal fictions whose
216. Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
217. Id. at 254-57.
218. Id. at 255.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 257.
222. Publ. Interest Bounty Hunters v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 548 F. Supp. 157, 162-63 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
223. Id. at 159.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 162.
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protective shells can be pierced under appropriate circumstances in
order to expose the individual persons responsible for the entity's
actions." '226 The court further stated that the noble mission and
public spirit contained within the foundation's charter should not
preclude common sense from revealing that the trustee utilized
such an instrumentality to avoid liability. 7  The court thereby
discerned that the plaintiff was the real party because the
foundation had no real assets and plaintiff was the sole shareholder
and then awarded attorneys fees to the government.
In Barineau v. Barineau, the District Court of Appeals of
Florida held that an entity's non-profit status does not preclude the
application of the piercing remedy. 9 The trial court ruled as a
matter of law that a non-profit corporation could not be the alter
ego of an individual.23 ° In a per curiam opinion, the appellate court
observed that although one cannot exercise control of a not-for-
profit entity in the same legal manner as a corporation-for
example, as a shareholder-"a person can be held personally
liable.., if the evidence shows that the person... did in fact
exercise control [of the not-for-profit entity]."' The court
indicated that a sufficient factual showing might deem a not-for-
profit entity as the alter ego of an individual. 2 The appeals court
thereby reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that a non-
profit corporation could be the alter ego of an individual. 3
A number of other jurisdictions considering this question,
while not finding a sufficient factual basis to pierce a not-for-profit
entity, have suggested that the doctrine should be available. 4
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 165.
229. Barineau v. Barineau, 662 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
230. Id. at 1008.
231. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.75 (perm.
ed., rev. vol. 1999).
232. Id. at 1009. This court would seem to have no problem with reverse or
triangular piercing as well.
233. Id.
234. See Lycoming County Nursing Home Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 627 A.2d
238, 291 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (allowing plaintiff to pierce a nursing home to
reach the assets of a public entity); DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 471
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Many of the courts that have allowed this remedy to apply to a not-
for-profit entity did so despite the lack of the remedy appearing in
the state statutory framework. 235 These developments suggest the
propriety of this remedy.
B. Need for Piercing in Context of New York Not-for-Profit
Corporations
Piercing fills a gap in current New York law regarding not-for-
profit corporations 36  The piercing remedy holds accountable
those who abuse the entity of a not-for-profit corporation for
personal benefit. The remedy compensates the entity for the losses
incurred by the wrongful activity of its officers or directors, and
thereby rewards the beneficiaries of the not-for-profit corporation.
A.2d 638, 641 (Conn. 1984) (holding a corporation liable for debts of a not-for-
profit entity under piercing remedy); Lake Otis Clinic, Inc. v. State, 650 P.2d 388,
396 (Alaska 1982) (holding a not-for-profit entity liable for the debts of an
individual under a reverse piercing claim with no specific consideration on
whether the entity status as non-profit precluded the remedy); cf. Christofferson
v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 644 P.2d 577, 596 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding facts did not suffice to pierce an entity, but court did not preclude the
application of piercing to a not-for-profit entity); Jabczenski v. S. Pac. Mem'l
Hosps., Inc., 579 P.2d 53, 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding factual record did not
indicate disregarding corporate fiction, not-for-profit entity issue not discussed);
Jones v. Briley, 593 So.2d 391, 397 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (denying piercing claim as
applied to a not-for-profit entity on factual rather than legal basis); United States
v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit of Wetterer, 210 F.3d 96, 107-11
(2d Cir. 2000) (applying federal and Guatemalan law and considering whether
piercing claim applied to a not-for-profit entity, but deciding against the
application on factual analysis).
235. See generally ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.65.170, 10.06.478, 10.06.480 (Michie
2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.0830, 607.0832, 607.0834, 617.0830, 617.0832,
617.0834 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-830, 14-2-842, 14-2-860, 14-8-30-
31, 14-3-842, 14-3-860, 14-3-865 (2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:91-95,
12:219-221, 12:226 (West 2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 512, 5712-13 (West
2002). Cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 717, 719-20 (McKinney 2001); N.Y. NOT-
FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 713-77, 720, 720(a) (McKinney 2001); see also
sources cited supra notes 36-37, 39-69, 163-67 and accompanying text.
236. See sources cited supra notes 39-84 and accompanying text. The remedy
also serves the intermediate situation that is not so egregious so as to involve
action from the AG, but which conduct is noticeable by persons affiliated with
such not-for-profit corporation.
2003] 485
486 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
Finally, piercing provides deterrence against future wrongdoing
against the organization.
While the accounting remedy available under section 720 of
the N-PCL serves to compensate the not-for-profit corporation for
its lost assets, it does not compensate the entity for the abuse of the
not-for-profit status as a vehicle for personal gain.237 Under the
piercing doctrine, a plaintiff with standing chooses a substantive
cause of action against alleged wrongdoers. Once the plaintiff
establishes liability, the enforcement of such judgment begins.
Without the remedy, a liable individual may be able to escape
liability through various means.238 Under the piercing doctrine, a
plaintiff can attack the defendants' personal assets, or those of
affiliated entities through reverse and triangular piercing.
Thereby, there would be no place to run and hide for someone who
chooses to cloak their assets.
Just as a judgment against a director of a BC for alleged
wrongdoing benefits the shareholders of the corporation, a
judgment for a not-for-profit corporation serves the beneficiaries
of the services that entity providesY This is particularly true for
those organizations engaged in true charitable activities, that is,
where the donors and the beneficiaries are distinct.' Suppose, for
instance, a not-for-profit corporation promises its donors that for
every one hundred dollars donated, the entity will deliver twenty
pounds of food to needy families. If, in the interim, certain
controlling persons divert millions of dollars of the not-for-profit
corporation assets, the real victims are the families to whom such
donations were to benefit. Allowing the not-for-profit corporation
to pursue such wrongdoers and to ignore corporate fiction serves
to vindicate the real beneficiaries and restore a damaged entity to
its noble purposes.
Piercing deters future wrongdoing by both: (i) the specific
corporate actors involved in not-for-profit corporation fraud and
(ii) those prospective persons who serve or will serve in positions
of trust at these organizations. Deterrence, a criminal law doctrine,
237. Supra note 65 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
239. See Hansmann, supra note 32, at 568.
240. See id. at 505.
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views punishment as a means of social control and prevention of
crime. 4 Ideally, those persons punished for a particular crime
should be deterred from committing the same offense again
[specific deterrence]. 2 In addition, the punishment of those
individuals sends a message to society not to act in that manner
[general deterrence].243 Piercing, if applied to the numerous cases of
not-for-profit corporate fraud, could serve to prevent future abuse
of the entity and encourage responsible service in positions of
authority within the organization.2"
While the piercing remedial claim produces a wealth of
litigation with regards to the BC,25 the corresponding dearth of
litigation in the not-for-profit corporation context merits
consideration. The litigiousness of the piercing remedy involving
BCs necessarily involves debatable instances wherein the remedy
may be appropriate. While shareholders, creditors, and directors
are enforcing the rights of a BC to prevent individuals from
perpetuating fraud, such persons at a not-for-profit corporation
typically must rely upon the services of the AG to achieve the same
result.4 6 Certainly, the lack of corresponding litigation on the not-
for-profit front is not a result of these officers and directors acting
more responsibly than their BC counterparts.24 7  Although
increased litigation may result, the goal of responsible management
is a result surely worth the price of applying the piercing remedy to
not-for-profit corporations.
241. Cotton, supra note 33, at 1316.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Cf. Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REv. 227, 245 n.70. Professor Manne noted:
Many who consider whether or not to join a board of a [not-for-profit
corporation] worry about exposing themselves to the risk of personal liability
lawsuits as a result of their becoming board members. Furthermore, the
wealthier potential board members may be, the more they are likely to worry
that their wealth alone will attract lawsuits. And yet, for a variety of reasons, it
is just this class of persons that [not-for-profit entities] like to attract to their
boards.
Id.
245. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
246. See sources cited supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
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C. Piercing Applied to New York Not-for-Profit Corporations
Piercing would complement the current framework governing
not-for-profit corporations under New York law. The current N-
PCL provisions on standing,248 fiduciary duties,"' remedies," and
qualified immunity25 would remain in a piercing analysis. Once a
plaintiff establishes a substantive violation,252 the piercing remedy
would allow that plaintiff to pursue the defendant.
The plaintiff must first demonstrate that the defendant was an
equitable owner of the not-for-profit corporation.253 While no
person can legally control a not-for-profit corporation in the same
manner that a controlling shareholder exercises control over a BC,
the plaintiff may establish that the defendant was a de facto owner
of the entity.5  Once the plaintiff demonstrates equitable
ownership, s/he must then show that, "(1) the owners exercised
complete domination of the corporation in respect to the attacked
transaction; and (2) that such domination was used to commit a
fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff's
injury."" A plaintiff would then repeat this analysis for any
248. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the N-PCL
standing provisions taken in conjunction with the piercing remedy would serve to
relieve the already burdened AG's office. See supra notes 207-08 and
accompanying text. The AG's office could then focus upon criminal charges in
the most extreme cases of not-for-profit corporation fraud and abuse.
249. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
251. See sources cited supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
252. Such substantive liability may arise from the provisions of the N-PCL-
breach of fiduciary duties-or other laws. See, e.g., supra notes 59, 71-80, 140-49
and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
255. Morris v. N.Y. State Dep't. of Taxation & Fin., 603 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11
(N.Y. 1993); see sources cited supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. Of
course, if the not-for-profit corporation were a 501(c)(3) organization and the
director served the entity without pay, the qualified immunity provisions of N-
PCL, Section 720(a), would apply. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
If the defendant put forth such affirmative defense before the service of answers,
only grossly negligent or fraudulent activity would be subject to attack. See supra
notes 68-69 and accompanying text. Thereby, volunteer service provided to
charitable organizations would be virtually unaffected. The plaintiff would have
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subsequent piercing or reverse piercing analysis necessary to satisfy
the judgment.
CONCLUSION
If Scheuer obtained a verdict for the Foundation against the
Directors and 61 Associates, the piercing remedy would allow the
enforcement of the judgment. Scheuer would probably have to
pursue reverse piercing remedial claims against the Directors and
piercing remedial claims against 61 Associates. In any event,
Scheuer would have to first prove equitable ownership of the
Foundation by the Directors.
The Directors, while not equity holders of the Foundation,
were able to invest the assets of the Foundation at will, conceal all
financial reporting information of the Foundation and effectively
used threats and other tactics to silence any Foundation
opposition. These factors would seem to demonstrate de facto
control over the Foundation, and thus subject the Directors to the
piercing remedy.
Scheuer must then demonstrate the first element of the Morris
piercing test: complete domination. Scheuer must prove that the
Directors "exercised complete domination of the [not-for-profit
corporation] with respect to the attacked transaction." ' 6  With
regards to the investment decisions of the entity, the Directors
effectively acted alone, concealing and threatening any attempted
involvement from other persons in their decision-making. In so
doing, the Directors effectuated investments to benefit themselves
and affiliated entities rather than the Foundation. The Directors'
conduct is apparently demonstrative of complete control under
Morris.
Next, Scheuer must also show that the Directors utilized that
domination "to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which
resulted in plaintiff's injury." 7 The Foundation purportedly lost
over $5 million in assets due to the investment decisions made by
to allege very egregious activity on the part of the director.
256. Morris, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
257. Id. at 810-11.
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the Directors." The conduct of the Directors, in seeking personal
pecuniary benefits over the interests of the Foundation,
proximately caused the loss to the Foundation. Therefore, Scheuer
would likely be able to establish a successful piercing remedial
claim. Whether the individual assets of the Directors should be
reached to satisfy the judgment, or should Scheuer pierce again
against affiliated entities, the Foundation benefits from the
applicability of the remedy.
Officers and directors who choose to serve a not-for-profit
corporation should do so responsibly. Tax exempt entities
receiving tax deductible donations and performing charitable
services should not be less regulated than for-profit entities that
can, for the most part, patrol themselves due to the rights afforded
to equity holders. The public benefits by having entities that
actually fulfill the services professed in their formation documents.
The occasional headline, scandal or indictment against persons
who grossly profit at the expense of a not-for-profit corporation
raises the question of how many of these organizations fall below
the radar screen. The piercing equitable remedy follows common
law and the current New York statutory construction, relieves the
government of the burden of sole enforcement of not-for-profit
corporate duties and empowers creditors, members, and honest
officers and directors to recover funds for the entity, so that it may
fulfill its true mission.
258. See Amended Complaint.
